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After the collapse of the centralized Soeharto regime, deforestation caused by over-
logging accelerated. To tackle this problem, an IMF/World Bank-led forestry sector re-
form program adopted a market-friendly approach involving the resumption of round
wood exports and raising of the resource rent fee, with the aim to stop rent accumulation
by plywood companies, which had enjoyed a supply of round wood at privileged prices.
The Indonesian government, for its part, decentralized the forest concession manage-
ment system to provide incentives for local governments and communities to carry out
sustainable forest management. However, neither policy reform worked effectively. The
round wood export ban was reimposed and the forest management system centralized
again with cooperation from a newly funded industry-led institution. In the midst of the
confusion surrounding the policy reversal, the gap between the price of round wood in
international and domestic markets failed to contract, although rent allocations to ply-
wood companies were reduced during 1998–2003. The rents were not collected prop-
erly by the government, but accumulated unexpectedly in the hands of players in the
black market for round wood.
I. INTRODUCTION
SINCE the economic crisis and the collapse of the Soeharto regime in 1998,deforestation has taken place at a rapid pace in Indonesia. The World Bankhas made the shocking forecast that Indonesia’s lowland natural forests will
disappear by 2010 unless effective measures are taken to stop the deforestation.1 It
has been argued that the causes of the deforestation include over-logging, fires,
transmigration, and the conversion of forests to agricultural land. However, since
the crisis, the problem of illegal logging has gathered attention and the issue of
governance for sustainable forest management has become a topic of discussion.
The arguments concerning governance for forest management can be put into the
following four categories. One is the argument that the decentralization of power
1 According to Holmes (2000), the lowland natural forests will disappear in Sumatra by 2005 and in
Kalimantan by 2010.
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and the enactment of the 1999 Forestry Act caused the failure of centralized con-
trol, which in turn led to attempts to move control to cooperatives and communi-
ties, and that institutional confusion arose in the transition process (Casson 2001;
Dermawan and Resosudarmo 2002; Kartodihardjo 2002; McCarthy 2000). A sec-
ond is the politico-social analysis that the growth of poverty caused by the eco-
nomic crisis and the deterioration of order in the police and military accompanying
the collapse of the Soeharto regime had a negative impact on the ability to control
smuggling and illegal logging, leading to lawlessness in logging (Dudley 2002;
Obidzinski and Suramenggala 2000). A third is the political economy analysis,
focusing on developmentalism and the supply-demand balance of round wood, which
argues that the thoughtless industrial promotion policy targeting the plywood, pulp,
and palm oil industries, without giving consideration to the supply ability of for-
estry resources, has been carried out in a form that favors the growth of the
Chinese-origin business groups that were cronies of Soeharto, ignoring the sustain-
able management of forests (Ascher 1999, chap. 3; Barr 2001; Brown 1999, 2002b).
A fourth argument focuses on the distortion of round wood prices in Indonesia,
claiming that the export ban on round wood and the low level of logging concession
fees and taxes created a gap between international and domestic prices, and that the
price mechanism was no longer able to make adjustments for sustainable forest
management. This argument was made by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank as they promoted forestry sector reform beginning in 1998. In
order to make prices of round wood more appropriate, measures such as the re-
sumption of round wood exports, the abolition of the plywood export cartel, and a
reform of the logging concession system were taken under IMF control.
However, the price mechanism approach implemented under the initiative of the
IMF and World Bank was unable to stop the rampant illegal logging and deforesta-
tion. Rather, the resumption of round wood exports confused the market, leading to
an expansion of the illegal market, and resulting in the reinstitution of the ban on
round wood exports. The institutional reform led by the Indonesian Ministry of
Forestry, which was carried out along with the general trend toward the decentrali-
zation of power, also stalled and the program had to be reviewed. In this study, we
will overview the institutional reform of the forestry industry since 1998 and ana-
lyze its outcome and effectiveness from the point of view of changes in the distribu-
tion of natural resource rents.
II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: RENT AND INCENTIVES
Although natural resources such as wood are renewable, unlike mineral resources,
the marginal cost for obtaining the resources rises as their exploitation proceeds. As
long as the marginal cost is lower than the price, in a situation akin to a monopoly,
a profit larger than that obtained through ordinary market transactions arises. This
151FORESTRY SECTOR REFORM
profit is called a “rent.” Since a rent is an additional profit that would not arise under
completely free competition, it is considered to be economically inefficient. How-
ever, natural resources are common property, and price adjustments do not func-
tion. As a result, given free access to the resource, the marginal cost can easily be
higher than the marginal revenue. Therefore, unlike a monopoly rent, the existence
of a natural resource rent shows efficiency. Thus it becomes important to establish
property rights over natural resources as a measure to resolve this problem of free
access (Khan 2000).
The establishment of property rights means the creation of rents in an institu-
tional way. The establishment of property rights, as shown by Coase, leads to
efficiency. In this case, the existence of rents creates the initial conditions for in-
vestment in the forest resource sector, thus contributing to industrial development,
and at the same time, providing incentives for forest concession holders to conduct
sustainable forest management. However, the establishment of property rights does
not necessarily mean the establishment of private property rights. There is an argu-
ment that when managing common goods such as natural resources, management
by communities can provide better monitoring functions than the establishment of
private property rights (Ostrom 1990). On the other hand, blanket ownership and
control by the national government is more efficient in a centralized country where
overall coordination is relatively smooth. Thus the question of who receives the
rent determines its effectiveness as an incentive for sustainable forest management.
In Indonesia, forests are basically owned by the state, and the central govern-
ment has responsibility for property right management. The government has given
forest logging concessions to corporations and cooperatives, assigning them to
manage the allocated area on its behalf, and obtaining income in return through
levies such as logging concession fees and taxes. If the government raises the fees
and taxes to a higher level than necessary, no rent will remain in the hands of the
logging companies, and there will be little incentive for them to carry out proper
forest management. On the other hand, if the logging companies are given too much
rent, government income will decrease, thereby lowering the incentive for the gov-
ernment to monitor forest management.
The choice of who is responsible for monitoring logging activities is important
as well. If the right to issue logging concessions shifts from the central government
to local governments, the rents such as concession fees and tax income will go to
the local governments. It is also possible to give the rights to communities as a
means to achieve thorough forest management. In Indonesia, traditional commu-
nity rights for forest resource utilization were stipulated in the 1999 Forestry Act,
and with the enactment of the decentralization laws in 1999,2 local governments
2 The Act No. 22/1999 on Regional Governance and Act No. 25/1999 on Fiscal Balance between the
Center and the Regions went into force in January 2001.
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have been allowed to issue small-scale logging concessions. However, the decen-
tralization of power caused problems such as the overlapping of areas for which
logging concessions were given and the over-issuing of logging concessions by
local governments. It has been shown that even if the authority to issue logging
concessions is partially transferred to local governments, in the absence of coordi-
nation with the central government, the rent cannot function as an incentive for
sustainable forest management.
Forest resource rents in Indonesia were also utilized for the promotion of the
plywood industry. This was done by holding down the prices of round wood used
by the plywood mills as a policy, thereby transferring the rents of the logging com-
panies to the plywood companies. Thanks to these secured profits, it was expected
that the plywood companies would expand their scale and increase their interna-
tional competitiveness. Concretely, round wood exports were banned in order to
keep down the prices for domestic distribution, and logging concessions were given
preferentially to companies that had plywood mills, to ensure that the profits aris-
ing from the difference between the international and domestic prices would accu-
mulate in the plywood companies as rent.
In debates on industrial policies with respect to the “East Asian experience,”
such transfer rents are, under certain fixed rules, considered to be economically
efficient in the long run as an incentive for technical upgrading and higher manage-
ment efficiency (Khan 2000). In fact Indonesia succeeded in increasing plywood
exports through this policy, transforming the industry into a major earner of foreign
currency. However, as a result of the enormous rents accumulated in the industry,
the natural resource rent, which essentially should be an incentive for sustainable
forest management, functioned contradictorily as an incentive accelerating defor-
estation by promoting logging activities for the sake of the growth of wood-based
industries.
Therefore, in the forestry sector reform carried out by IMF and the World Bank
since 1998, transfer rents became a target of criticism, and an attempt was made to
have the national government absorb forest resource rents through the resumption
of round wood exports and the reform of the logging concession system. How has
the distribution of rents changed as a result? Let us now follow the process of for-
estry sector reform and the change in the distribution of rents between the govern-
ment and the plywood industry, and examine how they have functioned as an incen-
tive as a result of the institutional reform.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOREST-RESOURCE-BASED
INDUSTRIES AND DEFORESTATION
For Indonesia, which possesses the third-largest forest area in the world, with 60
percent of its land covered by forests, forest resources are an important means of
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earning foreign currency. Beginning in the 1960s, the utilization of forest resources
was accelerated under the developmentalism of the Soeharto regime, and in the
1970s forest-resource-based industries, which were mainly involved in round wood
exports, earned 20 percent of the country’s foreign currency income. The harvest
rules for round wood were stipulated in the 1967 Forestry Act. The central govern-
ment gave forest concession rights (hak pengusahaan hutan, HPH) within the pro-
duction forests to logging operators for a duration of 20 years (with the possibility
of a 15-year extension) and allowed them to harvest following selective cutting
practices.3
The year 1979 was a major turning point for the Indonesian forestry industry. As
a means to promote the domestic wood processing industry, HPH holders were
obliged to build wood processing mills, and sawmills were obliged to supply their
products to the domestic market. In 1981, the government decided to place the
plywood industry at the center of the wood processing industry, by adopting a mea-
sure to restrict round wood exports to HPH holders possessing or building plywood
mills. As a result, HPH holders had to either set up their own plywood mills or sell
their concessions to companies that already held processing capability (Araya 1998).
Due to these policies to promote the plywood industry, plywood exports reached
U.S.$509 million in 1983, surpassing round wood exports. In 1985, exports of round
wood were completely banned, in a move that accelerated exports of plywood. In
1990, the number of plywood mills totaled 132, with an annual production of 10
million cubic meters, and in 1993 the plywood industry gained export income of
U.S.$4.1 billion, accounting for more than 10 percent of total exports (Table I).
The round wood export ban and the measure to link plywood mills and HPH
holders provided a mechanism for supplying round wood to plywood mills at a
lower price than the international price, resulting in the concentration of HPH hold-
ing among a handful of corporate groups with processing capability. By the mid-
1990s, 10 corporate groups held 228 of the total of 585 HPHs in number; 27 million
ha of the national total of 62 million ha in terms of area; and around 40 percent of
the total in terms of production. These groups included, among others, the Barito
Pacific Group and Bob Hasan Group, which were cronies of President Soeharto, as
well as companies whose main shareholders were the national army and police
(Brown 1999; Barr 2001).
The Indonesia Plywood Association (Asosiasi Panel Kayu Indonesia, APKINDO)
played an important role in the development of the plywood industry. When
Mohamed Hasan (commonly known as Bob Hasan) became the president of the
association, it launched a policy of stabilizing the plywood price. Its 108 members
were divided into seven marketing groups depending on corporate size. The asso-
3 Under the selective harvest rule, each district is divided into 35 sections, and in each of them, round
wood with a diameter not smaller than 50 cm can be cut in the amount allowed by the government
in one year, to be revisited in a 35-year cycle.
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ciation worked with the Ministry of Industry and Trade, giving export licenses to
companies belonging to these groups. The Marketing Committee of the association
allocated an export quota to each group and set plywood prices. Thus, through a de
facto price cartel, Indonesia gained a dominant position in the world plywood mar-
ket, gaining a 79 percent share of the world market by the mid-1990s.
The member companies of APKINDO were obliged to pay membership fees to
the association, and these funds were utilized by Bob Hasan, the president of the
association, as political funds for President Soeharto, thus forming a system under
which a part of the rent income accumulated by the plywood companies was re-
turned to Soeharto. The major fees were an export promotion/market expansion fee
(U.S.$7–10 per cubic meter) and an aerial photography fee (U.S.$2–4 per cubic
meter). Furthermore, Bob Hasan preferentially allocated export-related business,
such as shipping and insurance, to his group companies and thus made huge profits
through plywood exports (Barr 2001, pp. 26–27).
However, partly due to resentment among the major buyers in Japan and the
Republic of Korea against APKINDO’s price cartel, Indonesia’s share in the ply-
wood market began to fall after the mid-1990s (Araya 1998). In 1999, its plywood
exports fell to the level of 6 million cubic meters and in 2002 generated revenues of
U.S.$1.5 billion, falling to 2.6 percent of total exports (Table I). It was replaced by
pulp and paper as the main forest-resource-based industry. The production total
increased from 325,000 tons in 1987 to 4.14 million tons in 2000, consuming 20.28
TABLE  I
EXPORTS OF INDONESIAN FOREST RESOURCE PRODUCTS
(U.S.$ million)
Year Sawn Timber Plywood Rattan Pulp and Paper Palm Oil Total Exports
1988 811 2,092 119 147 324 19,215
1989 707 2,325 153 199 296 21,159
1990 84 2,690 275 250 253 25,675
1991 90 2,772 269 312 335 29,142
1992 98 3,219 307 401 465 33,907
1993 129 4,128 333 483 535 36,823
1994 166 3,650 354 782 878 40,053
1995 159 3,452 375 1,504 973 45,418
1996 137 3,544 324 1,369 1,017 49,814
1997 112 3,477 204 1,953 1,662 53,444
1998 78 2,327 11 2,469 816 48,848
1999 80 2,254 16 2,646 1,170 48,665
2000 75 1,995 1 3,042 1,195 62,124
2001 88 1,656 — 2,555 1,222 56,321
2002 115 1,507 — 2,369 2,038 57,159
Source: Compiled by the author using data from Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Financial Sta-
tistics (various issues).
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million cubic meters of round wood. This amount is larger than the volume con-
sumed for plywood production.4
The development of the pulp and paper industry led to an increase in the wood
supply from sources other than the HPH system. In 1990, the government issued
industrial timber plantation concessions (hak pengusahaan-hutan tanaman industri,
HP-HTI5) for the acceleration of forestation, and also issued timber utilization li-
censes (izin pemanfaatan kayu, IPK6) permitting clear cutting in an area in return
for turning production forests into timber plantations in order to increase the supply
of round wood. While in the 1980s, 25 million cubic meters of round wood were
produced annually through HPHs alone, by the mid-1990s the production from
HPHs dropped to 17 million cubic meters, with 4.2 million cubic meters being
produced from IPKs to compensate for the decrease. IPK production reached 10
million cubic meters in fiscal year 1997/98, while the amount of logging from HPHs
dropped to 15.6 million cubic meters.7
With this development of industries, the domestic demand for round wood began
to surpass by large margins the total amount of round wood officially recorded by
the Ministry of Forestry. The government-approved production capacity for indus-
tries that had major demand for round wood was as follows (in round wood equiva-
lent terms): sawn timber, 22 million cubic meters; plywood, 19 million cubic meters;
pulp, 18 million cubic meters; for a total of 63.5 million cubic meters. Taking the
assumption that each industry produces at the approved production capacity level,
the comparison of these figures with the total legally sourced volume of 17.2 mil-
lion cubic meters, based on the internal documents of the Ministry of Forestry in
2000, leads to the conclusion that most round wood is illegally sourced (Brown
2002a). Furthermore, adding to this the 10 million cubic meters which is assumed
to have been smuggled to Malaysia and China,8 it can be assumed that more than 75
4 According to the data of the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), the amount of
plywood production in 2000 was 8.2 million cubic meters, which can be converted to the round
wood equivalent of 16.4 million cubic meters (the conversion rate for plywood to round wood is 1:
2).
5 Business permission for managing an industrial timber plantation with a duration of 30 years.
Operators are required to reforest 25 percent of the land. By getting this, clear cutting permission of
existing round wood is obtained.
6 IPK is a permit issued by the central government (or provincial governments) for clear cutting,
which is given for the purpose of conversion to plantation or land for transmigration. In principle,
issuance for this permit is applied to non-production forests, but often times a permit is given at the
same time to convert the natural forest to non-production forest. It is also sometimes issued to
convert a harvested production forest site into an industrial timber plantation (hutan tanaman industri,
HTI). (According to 1996 SK Dirgen No. 96, conversion to HTI is permitted when the amount of
commercial round wood with a diameter larger than 50 cm is less than 10 cubic meters per ha.) The
duration of IPK is one year and since there is no payment of a resource rent fee (provisi sumber
daya hutan, PSDH), round wood cheaper than from HPH can be supplied.
7 For figures, refer to Data Strategics Kuhutanan 2002 published by the Ministry of Forestry.
8 From the trial calculation by Forest Watch Indonesia (FWI) and Global Forest Watch (GFW).
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percent of the round wood produced in Indonesia is illegally sourced. This points to
a striking deterioration of forest management governance, which may have resulted
in the accelerated deforestation since the latter half of the 1990s.9
IV. FORESTRY SECTOR REFORM AFTER THE ECONOMIC CRISIS
It was the World Bank that initiated forestry reform, following the economic crisis,
as a means to counter the accelerated deforestation. In the second IMF Letter of
Intent (dated Jan. 15, 1998) of the economic reform program started in 1997, the
World Bank launched the reform with a traditional market-oriented approach. The
reform aimed at normalizing the market for round wood and plywood through the
resumption of round wood exports, removal of the plywood export market mo-
nopoly of the APKINDO price cartel, and the delinking of HPHs and plywood
mills. The reform was also meant to pave the way solidly for the government, rather
than cronies, to collect income from forest resources. The insertion of the reforesta-
tion fund, which was previously an off-budget fund used as a source of political
funds for President Soeharto, into the general account budget, the introduction of a
public tender system for HPH issuance and performance bonds,10 and a raise in
royalties were proposed.
As a result, in April 1998 the export tax for round wood exports was reduced
sharply and exports were resumed. By the end of 1998, the preferential issuance of
logging concessions to companies with plywood mills was stopped, and the market
intervention by APKINDO through the export quota system was eliminated. It was
decided to transfer the reforestation fund to the general account budget, and the
levied money, which had been called a royalty, now became a forest resource utili-
zation fee (provisi sumber daya hutan, PSDH, hereinafter “resource rent fee”) to be
collected in accordance with the amount of round wood harvested. The rate was set
at 6 percent of the market round wood price.11
In the Policy Reform Support Loan (PRSL) of the World Bank, issued in April
1998, in addition to the above-mentioned reform plans, it was agreed to complete
the reform of the logging concession system, including that of the role of the com-
munity in forest management, by the end of 1998. In addition, a request was made
that a moratorium be imposed on land usage conversion from production forest into
9 According to the Ministry of Forestry, the speed of the deforestation, which was 0.6–1.2 million ha
per year from 1970 to 1990, accelerated to 1.7 million ha per year from 1986 to 1997, 2–3 million
ha per year on and after 1999, and the remaining forest area was 104.98 million ha in 2000.
10 The deposit paid by logging companies before harvesting is returned with interest when logging is
done following the legal rules, but is confiscated as a fine when a violation of logging rules is
found. It thus function as an incentive for the observance of logging rules.
11 The income gained by the government through issuing logging concessions includes, in addition to
the forest-based business permission fee (U.S.$3–10/ha), a reforestation fund (dana reboisasi, DR),
and PSDH collected in accordance with the amount harvested.
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agricultural or timber plantations until the completion of the above reform. How-
ever, as there were delays in introducing the public tender system, the performance
bonds, and the moratorium on land usage conversion, the World Bank suspended
the second loan of the first phase of PRSL in December 1998. Following this pres-
sure, the public tender system for the issuance of HPH was finally introduced in
April 1999, but the performance bonds were never introduced.
After President Soeharto stepped down in May 1998, a new idea, influenced by
the arguments of Indonesian NGOs, Islamic groups, and discussions at universities,
was incorporated into the reform plan of the World Bank, which had previously
been biased in favor of economic efficiency. Minister of Forestry and Plantation
Muslimin Nasution, a member of an Islamic political party, insisted on the neces-
sity of redistributing forestry resources from the point of view of social justice, and
advocated a reform that would place limits on the possession of logging conces-
sions by private companies, promoting in their place cooperative ownership. In
June 1998, a reform committee was established including NGOs and universities,
and a reform plan which considered the rights of communities and decentralization
was put forward (Seymour and Kartodihardjo 2000, pp. 96–99). In the second phase
of PRSL, starting in May 1999, a proposal was made to value traditional commu-
nity rights in accordance with customary law, and the principal of community in-
volvement in forest management and the assurance of transparency in the process
of concession issuance were stipulated in the new Forestry Act (Act No. 41/1999).
Following the IMF/World Bank reform, the Indonesian government pushed
through a reform of the logging concession issuance system in relation to decen-
tralization. In 1999, it promulgated Government Regulation (No. 6/1999) which
gave regents (bupati) the authority to grant, to individuals and cooperatives, forest
products collection rights (hak pemungutan hasil hutan, HPHH), involving permis-
sion to collect forest products in a forest area not greater than 100 ha for a period of
one year, along with timber utilization and collection licenses (izin pemungutan
dan pemanfaatan kayu, IPPK), which were, like IPKs, permissions to clear cut
standing timber during the conversion of land usage.12 In some areas, the regent
might also now give a small-scale logging concession (HPH-Kecil) allowing selec-
tive cutting in an area not greater than 50,000 ha for a period of 20 years. With the
agreement of the HPH-holding company, the regent could grant a permission for
selective cutting within a HPH production forest. Although the central government
does not have a grasp of the exact number of various types of permits granted
12 The area was up to 100 ha and the duration one year. The regency government could impose a
forest resource utilization tax in addition to the levy imposed by the central government for logging
activities, and this was utilized by local governments as a financial source. According to 2003
research conducted by the author in Kutai Barat regent, East Kalimantan, out of the total revenue of
400 billion rupiahs in the 2002 budget of the regent, 16 billion rupiahs was income gained by
issuing IPPK.
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in different regencies, it is assumed that more than two thousand permits have been
issued.13
In accordance with the 1999 Forestry Act, the authority to issue HPHs was partly
transferred to the provinces. Areas between 10,000 ha and 50,000 ha would be
under the authority of the Minister of Forestry, but areas not greater than 10,000 ha
now fell under the authority of the provincial governor. Moreover, in order to elimi-
nate the concentration of HPH holdings, limits were introduced: each concession
area could be up to 50,000 ha; one group could hold up to 100,000 ha in a single
province and up to a total of 400,000 ha throughout the country. Prior to the enact-
ment of the new Forestry Act, the 1998 ministerial ordinance had already contained
a stipulation allocating 10 percent of new logging concessions to cooperatives, with
the final future goal being 20 percent, as a means to increase HPH holding by state-
or province-managed enterprises and cooperatives.14 Also, a regulation was consid-
ered which would preferentially allocate concessions with areas not greater than
10,000 ha issued by provinces to the cooperatives. As a result, a structure emerged
where not only the central government and large corporations, but also new actors
such as provincial governments, regency governments, and cooperatives could hold
a share of the forestry resource rent. However, many cooperatives have close ties
with provincial governments, the military, or politicians, and in many cases they
are used as new means to collect political funds (Brown 1999, pp. 54–59).
Despite the various institutional reforms, the ongoing deforestation and rampant
illegal logging continued, and it became inevitable that a fundamental change would
be made to the direction of reforms after 2000. Round wood exports were resumed
as a first step of the World Bank–led reform after the economic crisis. The round
wood export tax was cut from 200 to 30 percent in 1998, but a plan to reduce it
further to 10 percent was not realized, and exports failed to show vigorous growth,
due to the licensing system and strong resistance by APKINDO. The plywood in-
dustry insisted that opening the door to round wood exports at a time when there
was a shortage of round wood in the domestic market would result in an outflow of
round wood to Malaysia and to rampant illegal logging inside the country. It also
claimed that plywood production was just 20 million cubic meters in 2000, less
than one-third of the production capacity of the plants, due to the shortage of round
wood caused by the resumption of exports (ITTO, various issues). Moreover, even
after the resumption of exports, the gap between domestic and international prices
of round wood failed to narrow and it became difficult to control illegal exports.
Therefore, the government made a decision to reverse the policy and reimposed the
export ban with a duration of six months following a joint ministerial decree from
13 From an interview conducted at the Ministry of Forestry in August 2003. According to research in
Kutai Barat regent, the regent had issued 341 HPHH by 2002.
14 Stipulated in Decree of the Minister of Forestry and Plantation No. 732, 1998 (Kumenhutbun No.
732/1998).
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the Ministry of Forestry and the Ministry of Industry and Trade issued on October
8, 2001 (put into effect October 31). The ban was later extended indefinitely.
The decentralization of the forest management system, which had been ongoing
since 1999, also faced a policy reversal. Government Regulation No. 34, promul-
gated in June 2002, banned the issuance of logging concessions by regents, revers-
ing Government Regulation No. 6/1999, and nullified all licenses issued since Janu-
ary 2002.15 Government Regulation No. 34 also changed the supervisory authority
over plywood and pulp industry operations from the Ministry of Industry and Trade
to the Ministry of Forestry, with the aim to establish a system where the supply and
demand of raw timber would be overseen and adjusted in an integrated way. Until
then, the permit for production plant capacity, constituting the demand side for
round wood, had been granted by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the amount
of cutting had been supervised by the Ministry of Forestry through annual activity
reports submitted by each plant. However, because only plants consuming more
than 6,000 cubic meters of round wood per year were obliged to submit reports, and
worse, as only half of those actually submitted reports, it had been impossible for
the Ministry of Forestry to grasp the origin of the supply of raw timber in detail
(Brown 2002a, p. 10). Therefore, the reform was significant in terms of setting
controls for the sustainable amount of logging and timber distribution, and also
meant a major policy change from the World Bank reform that relied totally on the
supply side.
In December 2002, the Wood Industry Revitalization Agency (Badan Revitalisasi
Industri Kuhutananan, BRIK) was established under a joint ministerial decree of
the Ministry of Forestry and Ministry of Industry and Trade. The purpose was to
secure a legal supply of raw timber for the industry, to make sustainable forest
management possible by cutting the supply route of illegal logs, and to revitalize
the industry in the long term. Therefore, the top positions in the agency were domi-
nated by persons from the sawn timber association, plywood association, etc. The
system they introduced was to oblige traders to obtain a registered wood products
exporter certificate (eksportir terdaftar produk indsutri kuhutanan, ETPIK) issued
by the Ministry of Forestry and the Ministry of Industry and Trade when exporting
plywood, sawn timber, and furniture. The task of BRIK was to collect the docu-
ments necessary for certification—documentation of stock in all processes from
timber to finished products, wood mutation report (laporan mutasi kayu, LMK),
and forest products legal certification letter (surat keterangan sahuya hasil hutan,
SKSHH) at the distribution stage—and to make recommendations regarding ETPIK
certification to the Ministry of Forestry and the Ministry of Industry and Trade. In
July 2003, 3,794 companies filed applications and 3,588 companies obtained
15 Kutai Barat regent stopped issuing IPPK voluntarily in December 2001 and HPPH in June 2002.
However, as the HPH-Kecil issued to 12 corporations have a 20-year duration, they continue to be
effective.
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certificates. Although this refined system was established, voices have emerged
among foreign aid organizations and other groups questioning whether a self-
certification system led by business groups can be effective in stopping the circula-
tion of illegal logs.
Through this system, the Ministry of Forestry returned control over the logging
concessions, which had been partly given to regency governments, back to the cen-
ter again and formed a system of cooperation between the central government and
the business groups, with BRIK playing an important role in the export permit
certification process. This structure is ironically quite similar to the relation be-
tween the central government and APKINDO under the Soeharto regime, which
was the main target of the reform since 1998.
V. CHANGE OF THE RESOURCE RENT DISTRIBUTION
A. Institutional Reform and Rent Flows
Although we examined various institutional reforms since 1998 in detail in the
last section, we will now discuss how rent flowed through the institutional changes
and in whose hands it accumulated, from the point of the resource rent distribution.
Figure 1 shows rent flows under the Soeharto regime before the reforms. As ex-
plained in Section III, under this structure, through the round wood export ban and
the linkage between plywood mills and HPH, cheap round wood was supplied to
plywood companies and the export price was raised through APKINDO’s price
cartel. This led to the accumulation of rent in the plywood industry. Part of the rents
collected at plywood companies was absorbed as association fees levied by
APKINDO and passed on to President Soeharto as political funds. The rents dis-
tributed to the plywood industry functioned as an incentive for the development of
the industry, accelerating logging activities. However, as President Soeharto and
the government also accumulated sufficient rents, they also functioned as an incen-
tive to carry out proper supervision in order to maintain the forest logging conces-
sion management system, with the result being that illegal logging activities were
prevented.
However, IMF and the World Bank insisted that the accumulation of rent by the
industry was inefficient and promoted institutional reform, abolishing the plywood
price cartel and closing the gap between the domestic and international price of
round wood. By reimposing round wood exports and raising the logging conces-
sion fee and resource rent fee, they tried to stop the opaque flow of money accumu-
lated in the plywood industry and its partial utilization as political funds for Presi-
dent Soeharto. At the same time, they tried to promote the decentralization of power
and distribute the rent, which had been captured by the central government, to local
governments, thereby giving them an incentive for sustainable forest management.
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Fig. 1. Rent Flow during the Plywood Industry Fostering Period
under the Soeharto Regime
Source: By the author.
Note: Shaded boxes signify major actors receiving rents. Arrows signify the flow of the
rent.
President Soeharto
Central Government
Round Wood
Export Ban
Issuance of
Concession (HPH)
Levies
(DR, PSDH)
Political Funds
Supply of Cheap
Round Wood
Export Price
Cartel
Plywood Companies
APKINDOLogging Companies
Association
Fees
Source: By the author.
Note: Thick arrows signify rent flows, and shaded boxes major actors receiving rents. As
round wood is supplied to plywood companies at the market price, no rent is transferred.
Fig. 2. Ideal Structure of IMF/World Bank Reform
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The ideal rent flow as envisaged by the reform is shown in Figure 2. Here, the flow
of rent to the plywood companies disappears together with the flow through
APKINDO that was turned into political funds, and it is guaranteed that the rent
can be absorbed  by the government from logging companies, cooperatives, and com-
munities.
However, in the actual reform, neither the raising of the resource rent fee nor the
introduction of performance bonds was adequate, and the government could not
absorb the rent properly. Further, round wood exports were banned again, and the
plywood and pulp companies were able to accumulate rent by receiving a cheap
supply of round wood, either illegal or legal, as before. On the other hand, a struc-
ture was formed under which logging companies and communities avoided paying
the resource rent fee to the government by selling round wood in the illegal market,
thus accumulating rent (Figure 3). As discussed in Section III, since the plywood
Central
Government
Source: By the author.
Note: Thick arrows signify rent flows and shaded boxes major absorbers of rent. Con-
sumption of round wood not only by plywood companies but also by pulp companies
increased. Legal exports of round wood were done only temporarily, while log smug-
gling was going on constantly. Through illegal diversions, not only illegal operators, but
also logging companies became able to accumulate rents by avoiding payments of taxes
and fees.
Fig. 3. Rent Flows after the Resignation of Soeharto
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companies and pulp plants receive a supply of round wood from the illegal market,
the rent absorbed by people engaged in illegal logging and distribution is greater
than that absorbed legally by the government and logging companies, and a portion
is also captured by military officers and politicians who receive bribes for merely
closing their eyes to illegal activities.
According to Scotland (1998), who calculated how the rent accumulated by log-
ging companies actually changed between the periods before and after the eco-
nomic crisis, the excess profit (rent) dropped from 7.6 percent before the crisis to
3.5 percent after the crisis began. Furthermore, based on Scotland’s study, Barr
(2001, pp. 50–52) argures that the decrease of the profit rate was serious for small-
and medium-scale HPH holding companies, and it can be assumed that the weak-
ening of the business basis is one factor which encouraged illegal logging activi-
ties. Thus, the fact that the rent accumulated in the hands of the logging companies
decreased through the economic crisis shows that there was a structural change in
the rent distribution, where rents that were once captured by logging companies
and transferred to the plywood industry flowed into the hands of other entities.
B. International and Domestic Prices of Round Wood and the Rents of Plywood
Companies
How did the gap between the international and domestic prices of round wood,
which was criticized as producing rents for the plywood industry, actually change
throughout the institutional changes such as the resumption of round wood exports
and the raise in the resource rent fee? Figure 4 shows trends in the price of round
wood after the economic crisis, using ITTO data. Between 1993 and 1994, the
round wood price in Southeast Asia experienced instability because of the fear about
the shortage of round wood on the international market due to factors such as the
export ban in Saba, Malaysia. It then began to rise from the end of 1995 and reached
U.S.$250 in the first half of 1996. However, it dropped to around U.S.$200 in 1997
and then plunged at the beginning of the Asian currency crisis. We will take the
price of meranti of Sarawak, Malaysia as the international price and the price of
meranti for plywood production (inner material of plywood) in Indonesia as the
domestic price for our discussion here.16 The international price, which dropped
from 1998 to 1999, rose after that time until 2000 and stabilized around U.S.$155,
but dropped again to U.S.$120–130 at the end of 2001. In 2002, under the effect of
the restoration of the round wood export ban in Indonesia at the end of 2001, the
upward pressure on prices was intensified, and the price returned to a level between
U.S.$150 and 160.
Looking at the domestic price of round wood for plywood, it fluctuated from
1998 to mid-2001, moving along with the international price so the gap between
16 Price data extracted from ITTO’s Tropical Timber Market Report, issues 1998/1–2004/1.
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the two remained stable at around U.S.$60–80. However, in contrast to the interna-
tional price, which rose steadily from the latter half of 2001, the domestic price
continued to drop, resulting in a widening of the gap between the international and
domestic prices until it topped U.S.$80 in 2002, and U.S.$100 in 2003 (Figure 4).
The cause for this widening between the domestic and international prices of round
wood, contrary to the policy intention, seems to be the reinstitution of the round
wood export ban. The resumption of round wood exports in 1998 hardly achieved
the goal of narrowing the price gap. It can be assumed that this happened because
exports failed to expand greatly until 1999, since APKINDO opposed the round
wood exports using the domestic shortage of round wood supply as a pretext, and
since exports were on a permission basis. Later, although round wood exports in-
creased sharply in 2000, the increase was not sufficient to close the price gap. More-
over, with the reimposition of the export ban in October 2001, the domestic price
dropped and the gap with the international price actually widened.
What changes happened with respect to the rent accumulation in the plywood
industry through the reforms following the crisis in the changing market environ-
ment of round wood? Let us now proceed with our discussion, using the rent calcu-
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Fig. 4. Gap of International/Domestic Prices of Round Wood for Plywood
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lation formula proposed by Brown (1999). In it, rent is defined as the difference
gained by subtracting the total cost from the plywood export price (free on board,
FOB). The total cost includes production costs such as labor costs, fuel costs, ma-
chinery costs, etc. as well as association fees paid to APKINDO and office costs,
including necessary fees for export promotion and market expansion (referred to as
marketing fees in this paper), depreciation, and interest payments. Assuming an
exchange rate of Rp 2,350 to the U.S. dollar before the crisis and Rp 8,000 after the
crisis, and adding an increase of 15 percent in labor costs, 45 percent in fuel costs,
and 300 percent in the import price for capital goods such as machinery and glue
following the crisis into the cost calculation, the rent captured by the plywood com-
panies for 1996 before the economic crisis turns out to be U.S.$25.19 per cubic
meter of plywood and U.S.$12.59 per cubic meter of round wood. In December
1998, after the economic crisis, given the absence of the fee collection of APKINDO,
the rent that remained in the plywood companies increased greatly from the period
before the crisis, reaching U.S.$80 per cubic meter of plywood (U.S.$40 per cubic
meter of round wood) (Table II).
However, the analysis by Brown (1999) does not examine trends in the rent after
the resumption of round wood export, so here, we calculate the amount of the rent
of the plywood industry for each three-month period after 1998 using the ITTO
data on plywood and round wood prices together with the factory costs, office costs,
and exchange rate of 1998 after the crisis, as assumed by Brown, fixed as they were
(Figure 5). According to this calculation, the rent continued to rise from 1998 to the
end of 1999, reaching U.S.$122 per cubic meter of plywood and U.S.$61 per cubic
meter of round wood. After that, however, it dropped sharply, falling below zero in
April 2001. Then although it rose steadily to reach U.S.$42 per cubic meter of
plywood and U.S.$21 per cubic meter of round wood at the end of 2003, this was
still less than half of the figure in 1999. In this calculation, the exchange rate, labor
costs, and fuel costs after 1998 are fixed, but since in reality both labor costs and
fuel costs rose, and the exchange rate was over Rp 10,000 to the U.S. dollar, the
actual cost would be more than that assumed in this calculation and the rent of the
plywood industry even lower than the above figures.
As mentioned above, the gap between the international and domestic prices of
round wood widened from the latter half of 2001, but the rent of the plywood indus-
try fell by more than half from 2001 compared to 1999. This is contrary to the
commonly stated argument that the plywood industry would accumulate rent from
the cheap supply of round wood. Why was a structure formed where the rent would
not be allotted to the plywood industry despite the cheap supply of round wood
shown in the price gap between the international and domestic market? The influence
of the international plywood market environment must be carefully examined here.
In 1996, Indonesian plywood was traded at a high price of U.S.$500 (2.7 mm) per
cubic meter under the control of APKINDO, but by mid-1988 this price fell to
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TABLE  II
CAPTURED RENT OF PLYWOOD COMPANIES
(Rupiah)
1996 Dec. 1998 Mar. 1999 1998–2003
Production cost 241,251 501,704 501,704 501,704
Labor costs 19,904 22,916 22,916 22,916
Glue 54,144 216,576 216,576 216,576
Fuel costs 10,551 15,300 15,300 15,300
Additional raw materials 89,770 125,678 125,678 125,678
Facilities costs 775 775 775 775
Machinery 21,972 87,888 87,888 87,888
Others 32,571 32,571 32,571 32,571
Association fees 11,562 0 0  0
Office cost 50,407 26,907 26,907 26,907
General costs 7,144 7,144 7,144 7,144
Others 282 282 282 282
Marketing fees 42,981 19,481 19,481 19,481
Depreciation 51,888 176,640 176,640 176,640
Interest payments 46,706 159,000 159,000 159,000
Total 390,252 864,251 864,251 864,251
Exchange rate 2,350 8,000 8,000 8,000
Total cost (U.S.$) 166.06 108.03 108.03 108.03
2 m3 of round wood (U.S.$) 230.00 76.875 100.00 Variable (1)
Plywood FOB price (U.S.$) 421.25 265.00 380.00 Variable (2)
Rent (U.S.$ / m3 of plywood) 25.19 80.09 171.97 —
Rent (U.S.$ / m3 of round wood) 12.59 40.05 85.98 Variable (3)
Source: Compiled by the author based on Brown (1999, p. 66, Table 6.4).
Notes: 1. It is assumed that  labor costs rose by 15% after the crisis.
2. It is assumed that  import costs for glue, machinery, etc. increased by 300% due to
the depreciation of the exchange rate, and that one-fifth of additional raw materi-
als were imported.
3. It is assumed that fuel costs rose by 45% after the crisis.
4. After the crisis the APKINDO association fee decreased to 0 and the marketing
fee dropped to U.S.$8.29.
5. The depreciation is for 15 years assuming machines at the cost of U.S.$26.50
million, which produce 80,000 cubic meters of plywood per year.
6. It is assumed that the interest is half of the cost of machines, and that U.S.$13.25
million is paid for through a dollar loan that charges 12% interest.
7. The exchange rate is assumed to be U.S.$1 = Rp 2,350, and U.S.$1 = Rp 8,000
after 1998.
8. The production cost after 1999 is fixed without taking the effect of the exchange
rate fluctuation into consideration.
9. The round wood necessary for the production of one cubic meter of plywood is
assumed to be two cubic meters.
10. Rent for plywood = plywood FOB price − round wood price (two cubic meters) −
total cost in U.S. dollars.
11. For variables (1) and (2), the data from 1998 to 2003 were used from ITTO (vari-
ous issues).
12. For variable (1), the domestic price of meranti (inner material) for plywood is used.
13. Variable (3) = variable (2) − variable (1) − total cost in U.S. dollars.
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U.S.$233 with the Asian currency crisis and the depreciation of the yen. However,
from the end of 1998, growing demand in China and the stronger yen resulted in a
price recovery, to U.S.$371 at the end of 1999. After 2001, however, the market
soured considerably due to the change of Chinese duties in favor of round wood
imports in 2001, the intensified competition with wooden products other than ply-
wood, and the depression in the construction sector in Japan, Korea, and Germany.
The price fell to U.S.$209 in March 2002. This low price may be partly due to the
fact that the removal of the Indonesian round wood export ban caused a great quan-
tity of round wood to flow to China and Malaysia, resulting in falling demand for
Indonesian plywood in China and strengthened competitiveness for Malaysian ply-
wood. Later in 2002, the plywood price recovered slightly, seemingly as the result
of the reinstitution of the round wood export ban by Indonesia. At the same time,
the export ban led to a shortage of round wood in Malaysia and an increase in
plywood imports by China. Thus, it can be said that the round wood export ban and
the international plywood market trends surrounding it had a significant influence
on the decrease of the rent captured by the plywood industry.
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Fig. 5. Rents of the Plywood Industry
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VI. CONCLUSION
The forestry sector reform promoted by IMF and the World Bank to cope with the
proceeding deforestation and rampant illegal logging after the economic crisis aimed
to correct the distortion of the round wood market caused by the plywood industry
promotion policy under the Soeharto regime, and to legally return the enormous
forest resource rents out of the hands of Soeharto cronies and back into the hands of
the government. For that purpose, the resumption of round wood exports, the rais-
ing of logging royalties, and the measures to abolish the link between HPHs and the
plywood mills and the price cartel by APKINDO, represented an attempt to close
the price gap between the domestic and international round wood market and to
absorb the rent into the government. However, these reforms did not move forward
as hoped for due to intensive resistance by the plywood companies. The raising of
the resource rent fee, the introduction of performance bonds, and even round wood
exports did not proceed as planned. In a situation where illegal logging and smug-
gling were not curtailed, a policy reversal in the form of the reinstitution of the
round wood export ban had to be made.
On the other hand, the reform of the concession system promoted by the Minis-
try of Forestry in the midst of the process of decentralizing power was also haphaz-
ard. In 1999, the right to issue concessions was given to regents and the forest
resource rent, which had been centrally controlled, was partly given to local gov-
ernments and communities as a means to raise the incentive for sustainable forest
management. Contrary to idealistic expectations, however, the overissue of conces-
sions by regents in local areas led to confusion in forestry management work, pro-
viding opportunities for illegal logging. The Ministry of Forestry then reversed its
policy and launched an integrated forest management policy, reclaiming the right
to issue concessions, which was once given to the local governments, and transfer-
ring forest-resource-based industries, such as the plywood and pulp industries, from
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Industry and Trade to the Ministry of Forestry. At
the same time, the Ministry of Forestry built a cooperative relation with BRIK, a
new body led by business groups, with the aim of expelling illegal round wood
from the demand. This close relationship, however, turned out to be a similar struc-
ture to the Soeharto era where the central government controlled the rent through a
centralized management, sharing it with particular business groups.
While the World Bank and the Ministry of Forestry were confused over the cor-
rect direction of reforms, the enormous rents being accumulated by the plywood
industry fell by half from 1998 to 2003. This was not, however, because the govern-
ment absorbed the rent by closing the gap between the international and domestic
prices of round wood and because of the raising of the resource rent fee, as intended
by the World Bank. Rather, although the price gap widened as a result of the
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reinstitution of the round wood export ban, the plywood industry was not able to
accumulate the rents in its hands due to the recession of the international plywood
market, and worse, it was obliged to chase cheaper round wood through illegal
supply sources in order to continue its operations. In the meantime, the rent flowed
overseas or to the illegal market and fell into the hands of those involved in illegal
logging and transactions, or of military officers and government officials who were
bribed to overlook illegal activities. Thus, although in the midst of institutional
reform after the crisis, the recipients of the forest resource rent did actually change,
in the final analysis an efficient distribution of rent, where the rent could play the
function of an incentive for sustainable forest management, was not achieved. Needed
policies include not only the reform of the supply side of round wood, through
measures such as strengthening the monitoring system to crack down on illegal
round wood circulation, but also more proactive intervention by the government
with an emphasis on the demand side of round wood. Measures such as the
downsizing of the forest resource based industry, which over-consumes forest re-
sources, should be thoroughly considered.
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